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CHINA'S REGIONAL POLITICS: A BIOGRAPHICAL APPROACH, (U)

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
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
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George C. S. Sung

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CHINA'S REGIONAL POLITICS: A BIOGRAPHICAL APPROACH\*

George C. S. Sung\*\*

Statistical analysis of biographical data is a relatively new technique in the study of Chinese political behavior. This paper utilizes this method to examine the state of Chinese provincial politics in 1971, by analyzing the background of those persons who were elected to secretarial positions (i.e., first secretary, second secretary, secretary or deputy secretary) in the CCP provincial committees between December 1970 and August 1971. This group is also compared with the provincial Party secretaries who held office in 1966, and from this some conclusions may be drawn about the changes in provincial leadership since the Cultural Revolution.

What are the characteristics of provincial politics in 1971? How do they differ from those of 1966? Do they differ from the politics at the Center? What factors can be identified which affect these characteristics and changes? To answer these questions, the personal background of the provincial secretaries "elected" during this period, and the circumstances of their "election," were examined from the point of view of eight significant factors. These were: (1) the date at which the Provincial Party Committee was formed, (2) the change in leadership, if any, from chairman of the Revolutionary Committee to first secretary of the Party Committee, (3) the appointment, in some cases, of a second secretary, (4) the field army (FA) affiliation of the new secretaries, (5) the question whether the new secretaries were "insiders" or "outsiders" in terms of the military regions involved, (6) the historical power base of the FA system, (7) differences in "generation," (8) the military or civilian status of the new secretaries.

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\* This is a revised and updated version of P-4998 issued in April 1973.

\*\* The author wishes to thank Dr. William W. Whitson for his helpful comments.

Correlations between these eight factors proved to yield some useful hypotheses for explaining the political trends existent in China during this period.

Some definition is warranted of these indicators, and an explanation of the basis for their selection as indicators. The four indicators of FA affiliation, military region affiliation ("outsider" or "insider"), civilian or military status, and generation affiliation were chosen because they are relatively specific and the data is available, because they suggest a loyalty to a corporate group rather than to a single personality, and because they have long term significance for the behavior of interest groups. Other possible indicators were not used because they were either too abstract (such as "left" or "right") or because sufficient data was lacking to use them persuasively (as in the case of the family ties).<sup>\*</sup> But these four indicators also call for judgments, and they should therefore be explained a little more thoroughly.

The generation affiliation is determined by the date of entry into the army, in the case of military personnel, or into the CCP for civilians. Each generation more or less represents a cycle of crisis in the history of the CCP and the Red Army. Twelve generations may be identified as follows:<sup>\*\*</sup> first, pre-May 1928; second, June 1928–November 1931; third, December 1931–July 1937; fourth, August 1937–December 1940; fifth, January 1941–August 1945; sixth, September 1945–October 1950; seventh, November 1950–September 1954; eighth, October 1954–September 1959; ninth, October 1959–December 1963; tenth, January 1964–January 1967; eleventh, February 1967–March 1969; and twelfth, April 1969–September 1972.

FA affiliation is not at all easy to determine. This affiliation was basically derived from data on the historical and personal ties

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<sup>\*</sup>W. W. Whitson, *Chinese Military and Political Leaders and the Distribution of Power in China, 1956–1971*, The Rand Corporation, R-1091-DOS/ARPA, May 1973.

<sup>\*\*</sup>For detailed discussion of the notion of "generation," see W. W. Whitson, "The Concept of Military Generation; The Chinese Communist Case," *Asian Survey*, November 1968.

of the secretary in question. Important considerations in this determination were military unit numbers (corps, division, and regiment), combat orders, battles, and areas of FA operation. A simplified chart of FA evolution (Chart A) stood as a basic guide for determining this affiliation. The chart explains the identification of field army affiliations, particularly after the military region structure replaced the FA system in 1955. In principle, military unit affiliation was given precedence over the geographical power base. The personnel of the 26th Corps, for example, had been affiliated with the Third FA even though they were located geographically in Shantung Military District, which was a power base of the Fifth FA and subordinate to the Tsinan Military Region. When neither the FA affiliation nor the military unit affiliation of a secretary was known after 1954, his FA affiliation was regarded as unknown. Under the same principle, if different FA affiliations were identified for one particular secretary, his FA affiliation during the period between 1938 and 1954 was regarded as decisive for purposes of this analysis.\* For civilian secretaries, the FA association was determined by their geographical location in the period prior to 1954. Those who devoted their careers to the national institutions and had little association with any of the five field armies were regarded as the Center elite. The Center elite and the Sixth FA elite will be used interchangeably.

A scheme of the geographical structure of the FA power bases follows:

First Field Army power base:

Lanchow MR: Kansu, Ninghsia, Shensi and Tsinghai  
Sinkiang MR: Sinkiang

Second Field Army power base:

Chengtuo MR: Szechwan and Tibet  
Kunming MR: Kweichow and Yunnan  
Wuhan MR: Honan and Hupeh

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\* For much more detailed charts on about 2000 leaders and a sense of the history of the FA system, one should read William W. Whitson, *The Chinese High Command, 1927-1971: A History of Communist Military Politics*, New York, Praeger, 1973.



Chart A

THE EVOLUTION OF FIELD ARMIES SINCE 1927

1927-1930	1931-1936	1937-1945	1946-1954	1955-1970	Founders
<p><b>Affiliated Units since 1954 (Corps)</b></p>					
<p><b>(RED ARMY PERIOD)</b></p> <p>Hsiang-O-Hsi Soviet</p> <p>Red Fourth Corps (West Hunan)</p> <p>Red Sixth Corps (West Hupch)</p>	<p><b>SECOND FRONT ARMY</b></p> <p>Red 2nd Army</p> <p>Red 6th Army</p>	<p><b>(8th ROUTE ARMY PERIOD)</b></p> <p>129th Division</p> <p>Shansi-Suiyuan Military District</p> <p>Shensi-Kansu-Ningxia Military District</p> <p>358 Brigade</p> <p>359 Brigade</p>	<p><b>(LIBERATION ARMY PERIOD)</b></p> <p>1st FIELD ARMY (North-West China Military Region)</p>	<p>MILITARY REGIONS</p> <p>Sinking</p> <p>Lanchou</p>	<p>Ho Lung</p>
<p><b>O-YU-WAN SOVIET</b></p> <p>Red New Fourth Corps</p> <p>Red Fifteenth Corps</p>	<p><b>FOURTH FRONT ARMY</b></p> <p>Red 4th Army</p> <p>4th Corps</p> <p>9th Corps</p> <p>30th Corps</p> <p>31st Corps</p> <p>33rd Corps</p> <p>25th Corps</p> <p>28th Corps</p>	<p>129th Division</p> <p>Shansi-Hopeh-Honan Military District</p> <p>385 Brigade</p> <p>386 Brigade</p>	<p>2nd FIELD ARMY (Central China Military Region)</p>	<p>Ch'engtu</p> <p>Wuhan</p> <p>Tibet</p> <p>Kunming</p>	<p>Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien</p> <p>Liu Po-ch'eng</p> <p>Chang Kuo-t'ao</p>
<p>(Stay behind group in Kiangsi)</p> <p>Red 7th Corps (Fang Chih-Min)</p>	<p><b>NEW 4th CORPS</b></p> <p>North-Kiangsu Military District</p> <p>North Hwai River Military District</p> <p>Central Kiangsu Military District</p> <p>Southern Kiangsu Military District</p> <p>Hupch-Honan-Anhui Military District</p> <p>Central Anhwei Military District</p> <p>Kiangsu-Chekiang Military District</p>	<p>3rd FIELD ARMY (East China Military Region)</p>	<p>Nanking</p> <p>Foochow</p>	<p>Ch'en I</p> <p>Su Yu</p>	
<p><b>CENTRAL (KIANGSI) SOVIET</b></p> <p>Red Third Corps</p> <p>Red Fourth Corps</p> <p>Red Fifth Corps</p> <p>Red Seventh Corps</p> <p>Red Twentieth Corps</p>	<p><b>FIRST FRONT ARMY</b></p> <p>Red 1st Army</p> <p>Red 3rd Army</p> <p>Red 5th Army</p>	<p><b>115th DIVISION</b></p> <p>Hopch-Jehol-Liaoning Military District</p> <p>Shantung Military District</p> <p>343 Brigade</p> <p>344 Brigade</p> <p>Independent Regiment</p> <p>Shansi-Chahar-Hopch Military District</p> <p>Hopch-Shantung-Honan Military District</p>	<p>4th FIELD ARMY (Manchuria Military Region)</p> <p>NORTH CHINA FIELD ARMY ("5th") (North China Military Region)</p>	<p>Shenyang</p> <p>Canton</p> <p>Shantung</p> <p>Inner-Mongolia</p> <p>Peking</p>	<p>Lin Piao</p> <p>Nieh Jung-chen</p>

Sources: 1. William Whitson, "The Field Army in Chinese Communist Military Politics," *The China Quarterly*, No. 37 (January-March 1969), p. 27.

2. Charts A, C, E, G, and I in Whitson, *The Chinese High Command*.

Third Field Army power base:

Fuchow MR: Fukien and Kiangsi  
 Nanking MR: Anhwei, Chekiang and Kiangsu

Fourth Field Army power base:

Canton MR: Hunan, Kwangsi and Kwangtung  
 Shenyang MR: Heilunkiang, Kirin and Liaoning

Fifth Field Army power base:

Peking MR: Hopeh, Inner Mongolia and Shansi  
 Tsinan MR: Shantung

The "outsider"/"insider" distinction is another important concept requiring judgment. It was based on a combination of military region and generation affiliations. Those secretaries who had been in the same MR for at least one full generation prior to their appointment were considered "insiders," whereas those who had come in from other MRs and had stayed for less than one full generation, were regarded as "outsiders." If a civilian or military official was appointed, for example, to the Lanchow MR in the twelfth generation period (from April 1969 to December 1971), he would have had to have already been in the Lanchow MR in the tenth generation period (between January 1964 and January 1967) in order to count as an "insider." Thus Ch'eng Shih-ch'ing was transferred from Shantung to Kiangsi in 1967 (in the eleventh generation period, between February 1967 and March 1969) to become the first secretary of the Kiangsi CCP in December 1970 (i.e., in the twelfth generation period). However, Ch'eng had been in the Tsinan MR in the tenth generation period (January 1964 to January 1967), and was therefore considered to be an "outsider" in the Fuchow MR in 1970. Following these criteria many "outsiders" who assumed the chairmanship or vice-chairmanship of provincial-level revolutionary committees retained their "outsider" status when they became secretaries of the same provincial-level party committees.

The emphasis in this study on the military region affiliation is explained by the facts that the geographic MR system has replaced the FA system since 1955, that MR boundaries by provinces are clearer than the FA area boundaries, based on the historic evolution of field armies, and that MR affiliations can apply to civilian as well as military cadres.

The distinction between military and civilian status was difficult in some cases. Those who had assumed military positions, particularly as political commissars, after the Cultural Revolution (1968), but did not have a military career prior to that were considered as civilians. Hua Kuo-feng, for example, was a Party cadre who became a political commissar of the Hunan Military District in August 1970, and who was therefore considered as civilian rather than military. Other examples of this are Hsieh Hsueh-kung of Tientsin, Liu Chien-hsün of Wuhan and Liu Chieh-t'ing of Chengtu. On the other hand, if a secretary had followed a substantial military career during the civil war and had then devoted his time to civilian affairs during the last two decades, he was considered a military man. General George Marshall was, after all, a military man in spite of being a U.S. secretary of state in the 1940s. Those who had formal military education or had actively participated in military activities during the civil war should have acquired enough "military values" to be considered military men. Thus those who held military ranks before the abolition of that system of rank and served primarily in the military organs, or those who had held military ranks before but had not been engaged in military work for some time, were categorized as military. The Kuomintang generals who defected to the People's Republic and assumed civilian posts there were considered civilians.

The date of formation of the party committees is an extremely important factor in this analysis. The twenty-six provinces and autonomous regions and the three centrally-directed municipalities of Shanghai, Peking, and Tientsin (referred to hereafter as provinces) took nine months, from December 1970 to August 1971, to form their new party committees. Those which were formed later presumably had more problems than the ones formed earlier, and so the twenty-nine provinces were divided for purposes of this analysis into two approximately equal groups, with 27 March 1971 as the cut-off date for the establishment of provincial-level committees.

Group A (provincial-level committees established before 27 March):  
 Anhwei, Chekiang, Honan, Hunan, Kansu, Kiangsi, Kirin,  
 Kwangsi, Kwangtung, Liaoning, Peking, Shanghai, Shensi, Tsinghai.



Group B (provincial-level committees established after 27 March):  
 Fukien, Heilungkiang, Hopeh, Hupeh, Inner Mongolia, Kweichow,  
 Ninghsia, Shansi, Shantung, Sinkiang, Szechwan, Tibet, Tientsin,  
 Yunnan.

The first part of this discussion will be based on a comparison between these two groups of provincial-level committees according to four different factors, namely whether they changed leaders, whether they appointed second secretaries, and finally the field army and military region affiliations of the new personnel.

#### Correlation 1: Changing Leaders

When a person is appointed to a position of leadership in replacement of the person who held that position or its equivalent before, several explanations can be offered. People have to retire some time, and personal factors may in some cases be decisive. In an institutionalized democratic system which provides open political competition for positions of leadership, rivalry between contenders for power tends to be open. But in other systems, any struggle for power tends to be covert and difficult for "outsiders" to trace correctly. This is the case in China. It is not of course possible to lay down hard and fast rules, but most people would surely agree that if the old leader is confirmed fairly speedily and apparently smoothly in the new position, this could be a prima facie indication that there has not been a severe struggle for power between him and a rival or rivals. On the other hand, if a new person is appointed, and after some delay, it is perhaps a prima facie hypothesis that there has been some difficulty in agreeing on the succession to a leader who is not for one reason or another suitable for reappointment or who does not wish to step down and resents being replaced by a new face.

The analytical evidence shows a clear correlation between changes in leadership of this kind and a delay in the smooth formation of the Party committees in 1971. During this period when the provincial-level Party committees were being set up, most of the provincial Party first secretaries were concurrently holding the chairmanship of the corresponding revolutionary committees, certainly until the formation of the Shantung Provincial Party Committee on 5 April 1971. In the case of



Shantung, it was a vice-chairman of the revolutionary committee who became the Party's first secretary, and the same thing happened with the Hopeh, Heilunkiang, Yunnan, Tibet, and Shansi Party committees. In the case of Kweichow and Inner Mongolia, the new first secretaries of the Party committees came from other provinces, from the Szechwan Provincial RC and the Kiangsu Provincial RC respectively.\* In each of these eight cases the CCP provincial committees were established in or after April 1971, and it is a fair inference that the necessity of changing leadership contributed to the delay in the smooth formation of Party committees where the leadership was changed.

#### Correlation 2: Need for Second Secretaries

When the Party committees were being constituted, as far as was known there was no specific provision as to the exact number of delegates to the Congress or the number of secretaries to be appointed. Some provinces and municipalities appointed second secretaries on their Party committee, others did not. There seems to be no observable connection between the appointment of second secretaries and the size of population of the province or municipality. This means that the appointment of a second secretary was a matter left to the discretion of the authorities concerned in each committee according to their political situation, and it is not too much to suppose that an important factor in the appointment of second secretaries was the need to establish a compromise between competing factions.

Chart B shows that there is an exceptionally high correlation between those Party committees which were late in being established, which changed their leadership, and which appointed second secretaries. Ten out of the thirteen provincial-level Party committees which appointed second

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\*The changing leaders of these eight provinces are: Wang Chia-tao replacing P'an Fu-sheng in Heilunkiang, Liu Tzu-hou replacing Li Hsueh-feng in Hopeh, Yu T'ai-chung replacing T'eng Hai-ch'ing in Inner Mongolia, Lan I-nung replacing Li Tsai-han in Kweichow, Hsieh Chen-hua replacing Liu Ko-p'ing in Shansi, Yang Te-chih replacing Wang Hsiao-yu in Shantung, Jen Jung replacing Tseng Yung-ya in Tibet, and Chou Hsing replacing Tan Fu-jen (died in December 1970) in Yunnan.

## Chart B

CORRELATIONS OF LATE ESTABLISHMENT, CHANGING LEADERS,  
AND NEED FOR SECOND SECRETARIESGROUP A (pre-March 27, 1971)GROUP B (post-March 27, 1971)

Name	New Leaders	Have 2nd Secretaries	Name	New Leaders	Have 2nd Secretaries
Anhwei			Fukien		X
Chekiang			Heilungkiang	X	X
Honan			Hopeh	X	X
Hunan			Hupei		X
Kansu			Inn. M.	X	
Kiangsi			Kweichow	X	
Kirin			Ninghsia		X
Kiangsu			Shansi	X	
Kwangsi			Shantung	X	X
Kwangtung			Sinkiang		X
Liaoning			Szechwan		X
Peking		X	Tibet	X	
Shanghai		X	Tientsin		X
Shensi			Yunnan	X	X
Tsinghai		X			

secretaries did not form their committees until after 27 March 1971. Every single Party committee which was formed after that date, and which is therefore listed in Group B, either changed its leader or else appointed a second secretary, and in four cases did both. In other words, the necessity to change the leadership, and the need to appoint a second secretary both contributed to the delay in the smooth formation of these Party committees. The desire to occupy the leadership position often invites struggle for the post among the contending groups. This certainly led to the delay in forming the committees. Consequently, the need to form the Party committees quickly after the delay might have led to the acceptance of a compromise in which second secretaries were appointed.\* The need for such compromise among contending groups in these provinces suggests that no one faction could claim clear dominance easily. In these "marginal" provinces (except Kiangsi), that is, provinces which were either too poor or already too divided since the post-1960 conflict to resist "outsider" invasion, Party committees were established late (after March 1971) and required either a new first party secretary, a second secretary, or both. Conversely, in "core" provinces where single factional dominance existed, the early establishment of a committee, usually with only one first secretary, could be accomplished without fanfare. These correlations are further supported in the light of the biographical analysis which follows.

### Correlation 3: Field Army Affiliations

Let us now take those provincial committees where both first and second secretaries were appointed, and examine any differences or

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\* In Group A, Peking, Shanghai, and Tsinghai are the only three exceptions which have second secretaries. In the case of Peking, the severe illness of Hsieh Fu-chih, the first secretary, perhaps was the main reason for having a second secretary. After Hsieh's death in March 1972, the second secretary became first secretary and the post of second secretary was abolished. In the case of Shanghai, Yao Wen-yüan was perhaps too prominent at that time to be one of the many secretaries in the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee; therefore, he was made second secretary subordinate to his protege, Chang Chun-chiao, without fanfare. The smooth formation of the Party committee in Tsinghai with a second secretary might be credited to the fact that both first and second secretaries were affiliated with the Fourth FA, "insiders," and the military.



similarities in the personal background of these two figures in each case. The data are set out in Chart C. It will immediately be noticed that in the majority of cases the first and second secretaries had different field army affiliations, and that in a majority of cases one of the two secretaries was a commander, the other a commissar. The field army affiliations and the commander/commissar distinction were the factors most frequently diffused. Only in four cases (Fukien, Shantung, Ninghsia, and Shanghai) did the first and second secretaries share the same field army affiliation. Even in these four cases, the two persons concerned either had different military region affiliations (one being an "outsider," and the other an "insider") or else belonged to different generations.

In the upshot, it was clearly the "insiders" and the military men who dominated provincial power.

The fact that the two most frequently diffused factors were the FA affiliation and the commander/commissar distinction suggests that the bond of the FA affiliation and the conflict between professional commanders and political commissars had in some measure weakened by 1971, and that these two factors were adjusted by mutual concession. On the other hand, it seems clear that those personalities who were "insiders" by military region affiliation and military profession showed a strong resistance to compromising with "outsiders" or with civilians. These trends suggest a deterioration of the more traditional FA affiliation, and by contrast a strengthening of the MR affiliation as a crucial factor in collective provincial leadership behavior.

During the height of the period when the Fourth FA was exerting power at the Center, from late 1966 to early 1971, it managed to gain control of some provinces not traditionally under its domination. Three of the six "outsiders" among the twenty-six newly appointed first and second secretaries came from the Fourth FA. They were Lung Shu-chin, Liang Hsing-ch'u, and Chou Ch'ih-p'ing. Lung Shu-chin, a follower of Lin Piao and Huang Yung-sheng, was transferred from Hunan Province to Sinkiang, thereby extending the interests of the Fourth FA. Liang Hsing-ch'u who was a deputy commander of Canton MR from 1956 to 1966,

Chart C

## BACKGROUNDS OF THE 1971 FIRST AND SECOND SECRETARIES

Committee	Position	Name	FA	Insider or Outsider	Military or Civilian	Commander or Commissar	Generation
Fukien	1st Sec.	Han Hsien-ch'u	4	In	M	Cdr.	1
Heilungkiang	2nd "	Chou Ch'ih-p'ing	4	Out	M	Cmsr.	3
	1st "	Wang Chia-tao	3	In	M	Cdr.	2
	2nd "	Liu Kuang-t'ao	4	In	M	Cmsr.	(3)
	1st "	Liu Tzu-hou	2	In	C		2
Hopeh	2nd "	Cheng San-sheng	5	In	M	Cdr.	3
	1st "	K'ang Chien-min	1	In	M	Cdr.	3
Hinghsia	2nd "	Kao Jui	3	Out	M	Cdr.	(3)
	1st "	Hsieh Fu-chih	2	In	M	Both	2
Peking	2nd "	Wu Te	5	In	C		2
Shantung	1st "	Yang Te-chih	5	In	M	Cdr.	1
	2nd "	Yüan Sheng-p'ing	5	In	M	Cmsr.	2
Sinkiang	1st "	Lung Shu-chin	4	Out	M	Cdr.	3
	2nd "	Sai Fu-ting	1	In	M	Cmsr.	3
Szechwan	1st "	Chang Kuo-hua	2	In	M	Both	2
	2nd "	Liang Hsing-ch'u	4	Out	M	Cdr.	1
Tientsin	1st "	Hsieh Hsueh-kung	5	In	C		3
	2nd "	Wu Tai	4	In	M	Cmsr.	2
Tsinghai	1st "	Liu Hsien-ch'üan	4	In	M	Cmsr.	3
	2nd "	Chang Chiang-liu	4	In	M	Cdr.	1
Yunnan	1st "	Chou Hsing	2	In	M	Cmsr.	2
	2nd "	Wang Pi-ch'eng	3	Out	M	Cdr.	1
Hupeh	1st "	Tseng Szu-yu	5	Out	M	Cdr.	2
	2nd "	Liu Feng	2	In	M	Both	4
Shanghai	1st "	Chang Ch'un-chiao	3	In	C	Cmsr.	7
	2nd "	Yao Wen-yüan	3	In	C		

Sources: Huang Chen-hsia, *Mao's Generals*, Research Institute of Contemporary History, Hong Kong, 1968;  
*Who's Who in Communist China*, Vols. I and II, Union Research Institute, Hong Kong, 1969-1970;  
 Shih Chi, *Chung kung Shen chi Hsin Tang Wei Jen wu Chih* (Who's Who in the New Province-Level  
 Party Committees of Communist China), Hong Kong, Contemporary China Research Institute, 1971.

was a leading supporter of Lin Piao and Huang Yung-sheng in Szechwan. His promotion to be commander of the Chengtu MR probably served to check the power of Chang Kuo-hua. Chou Ch'ih-p'ing, a troubleshooter for Lin Piao and former vice-minister of Metallurgical Industry, was transferred to Fukien in mid-1969. It is important to note that all of them disappeared after Lin Piao's fall. Clearly they assumed key positions in the provinces by riding on Lin Piao's coattails and were purged when their patron lost power at the Center.

#### Correlation 4: Military Region Affiliations

The provincial committees which were late rather than early in forming show a relatively high incidence of "outsider" appointments (i.e., persons not recently affiliated to the military region in which they are appointed), as is set out in Chart D. Of the early Group A only ten percent (eight out of seventy-six) of the appointments were "outsiders," whereas in the case of the later Group B, the proportion of "outsiders" was much higher, namely twenty-four percent (twenty out of eighty-two). Provinces with more "outsiders" in these two positions tended to form their Party committees late, with the implication that committee formation was delayed until "outsider" appointments could be effected. Those provinces which were late in establishing their Party committees, and yet did not appoint "outsiders," seem to have other specific problems as shown in Chart B. Thus Heilungkiang had conflicting elite groups of first and second secretaries, while Shansi, Shantung, and Tibet had problems of changing leaders (and Shantung also appointed a second secretary). In the case of Shantung, Yang Te-chih replaced Wang Hsiao-yu as chairman of the RC and became first secretary of Shantung CCP. If the need to change leaders and to appoint second secretaries is linked to the failure of a Party provincial leadership to form a Party committee fairly speedily after December 1970, biographical analysis thus suggests the existence of different and competing interest groups which may have played a large role in hindering the process of Party branch formation. "Insiders" retained a strong resistance to "outsiders" rather in the same way that military men resisted their civilian competitors.



Chart D

## BACKGROUNDS OF 1971 SECRETARIES

Committees	Total	MR			FA							Mili- tary	Civil- ian	U
		Out- sider	In- sider	Unk.	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	Unk.			
<b>Group A</b>														
Anhwei	5	0	5			2	2				1	3	2	
Chekiang	6	0	6				6					5	1	
Honan	5	0	5		1	3					1	3	2	
Hunan	3	0	3					3				2	1	
Kansu	3	1	1	1	1		1				1	2	1	
Kiangsi	4	2	2				2	1	1			3	1	
Kiangsu	5	0	5				4	1				4	1	
Kirin	6	0	5	1				5			1	3	2	
Kwangsi	4	1	3				2	2				3	1	
Kwangtung	5	0	5					5				3	2	
Liaoning	5	0	5			2		3				4	1	
Peking	7	2	5			3			4			5	2	
Shanghai	7	0	7				7					2	5	
Shensi	5	1	4		1		1	3				2	3	
Tsinghai	6	1	5		1			3			2	3	2	
Total	76	8	66	2	4	10	25	26	5		5	47	27	
<b>Group B</b>														
Fukien	7	2	5				4	2		1		5	2	
Heilungkiang	5	0	5				2	2	1			3	2	
Hopeh	7	1	6			1	1		4		1	4	3	
Hupei	7	2	5			5		1	1			6	1	
I. M.	5	3	2			1		2	2	1		3	2	
Kweichow	5	2	1	2		1		2		1	1	3	2	
Ninghsia	6	1	3	2		2		1		1	2	2	3	
Shansi	4	0	4		1			1	2			2	2	
Shantung	5	0	5				1		4			3	2	
Sinkiang	5	4	1		2		1	1	1			3	2	
Szechwan	8	3	5			3		3		2		5	3	
Tibet	7	0	6	1		4		2			1	4	3	
Tientsin	7	1	5	1				1	4		2	4	2	
Yunnan	4	1	3			3	1					3	1	
Total	82	20	56	6	3	20	10	18	19	6	7	50	30	

Sources: Huang Chen-hsia, *Mao's Generals*, Research Institute of Contemporary History, Hong Kong, 1968; *Who's Who in Communist China*, Vols. I and II, Union Research Institute, Hong Kong, 1969-1970; Shih Chi, *Chung Kung Sheng chi Hsin Tang Wei Jen wu Chih* (Who's Who in the New Provincial Level Party Committees of Communist China), Hong Kong, Contemporary China Research Institute, 1971.



It is also a valid hypothesis that "outsiders" appeared to be more vulnerable during times of crisis. The data in Chart D shows that twenty-eight out of the 158 secretarial posts were occupied by "outsiders." Since the fall of Lin Piao in mid-1971, however, a total of eight of these twenty-eight (or twenty-nine percent) have disappeared, whereas among the "insiders" only five out of 122 (four percent) have disappeared.\* Even the powerful "outsiders" like Chou Ch'ih-p'ing, Ch'eng Shih-ch'ing, Lan I-nung, Lung Shu-chin, and Liang Hsing-ch'u who were affiliated with the Fourth FA and were loyal to Lin Piao and Huang Yung-sheng, failed to escape disgrace. "Insiders" apparently wasted little time in chasing "outsiders" away when opportunity arose. This ability of "insiders" to resist "outsiders" provides another pointer to the significance of the military regions and the factional bond.

This suggestion is reinforced by the fact that the commanders of military regions tended to assume the first secretarial posts of the key provinces in their respective military regions. Seven out of the eleven military region commanders took the post of first secretary while two became second secretaries in their key provinces. In the other four first secretarial cases, it was the first political commissars who took the post.\*\* It seems likely from this that the commanders and

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\* These eight disappeared "outsiders" were Chou Ch'ih-p'ing of Fukien, Liu Hai-ch'ing of Hopeh, Pu Chan-ya of Hunan, Ch'eng Shih-ch'ing, and Yang Tung-liang of Kiansi, Lan I-nung of Kweichow, Lung Shu-chin of Sinkiang, and Liang Hsing-ch'u of Szechwan. The five disappeared "insiders" were Nan P'ing, Ch'en Li-yun, and Hsiung Ying-t'ang of Chekiang, Liu Feng of Hupeh and Hsieh Chia-hsiang of Szechwan. They were all military men. Determination of disappeared persons is based on their last appearance before 1 May 1972, according to *People's Daily* from 1 September 1971 to 1 October 1973, and FBIS *People's Republic of China* from 1 September 1971 to 31 October 1973. This data excludes Ninghsia personnel for lack of information.

\*\* Chou Hsing, Political Commissar of the Kunming MR, was the first secretary of the Yunnan Party Committee while Wang Pi-ch'eng, the Commander, became the second secretary. Hsien Heng-han, Political Commissar of the Lanchow MR, was the first secretary of the Kansu Party Committee while P'i Ting-chun, the Commander, was a secretary. Ting Sheng, Han Hsien-chu, Hsu Shih-yu, Chen Hsi-lien, Lung Shu-chin, Yang Te-chih, and Tseng Szu-yu were commanders of their respective military regions and concurrently first secretaries of the core provinces of their MRs.

some of the first political commissars of the eleven military regions are factional bosses, possibly with the authority to assign key positions, or to consent to the appointments to key positions in their subordinate provinces.

Thus, this study challenges the assertions that the military region commanders are more "administrators" than "commanders" of their regions, and that military region commanders are not empowered to control the main force units within their jurisdictions. The relocation of PLA main force units in 1967, the largest relocation of force units since the Korean War, is used to argue that the Center had greater control of military unit mobility.\* In fact, the argument based on this data failed to recognize that eleven of the fourteen relocated PLA main force units in 1967 were moved within, not outside of, the military regions. Only 21 Corps (moving from Shansi to Shensi), 27 Corps (from Shantung to Kiangsi), and 50 Corps (from the north Korean border area to Chengtu) moved out of their regions. Strictly speaking, 27 Corps, historically belonging to the Third FA, was moved to the Third FA territory. Therefore, Dr. Nelsen's Appendix, "Relocation of PLA Main Force Units, 1967," can be used to support the thesis of military region control and to challenge his own thesis that these corps movements revealed far greater central control.

#### Comparison of 1971 and 1966 Party Secretaries

We now come to the second purpose of this paper, which is to compare the lineup of provincial Party secretaries in 1971 with that of 1966, thereby indicating the extent of the changes caused by the Cultural Revolution. Four correlations are examined for this purpose, using the indicators of "outsider"/"insider" status, field army affiliation, military/civilian status, and generation affiliations.

"Insiders" dominated the provincial Party committees both in 1966 and in 1971. It is true that the "outsiders" increased their role from twelve percent in 1966 to seventeen percent in 1971, so that the ratio

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\* See Harvey Nelsen, "Military Forces in the Cultural Revolution," *The China Quarterly*, No. 51, July-September 1972, particularly pp. 446-447, p. 467, and pp. 472-474.

of "insiders" fell from eighty-five percent to seventy-eight percent.\* But the fact remains that "insiders" retained the overwhelming majority and with only a five percent increase in the appointment of "outsiders" in 1971 it can hardly be claimed that the twenty-nine provincial and municipal Party committees elected chiefly "outsiders" to the leading posts of their provincial Party machine. The "localism" of military region affiliations could appear to remain a controlling factor of elite grouping in Chinese politics even after the turbulence of the Cultural Revolution.

What happened to field army affiliations between 1966 and 1971? Chart E shows that the First and Fifth Field Armies took severe losses in the secretarial lineup, whereas the Fourth Field Army gained and the Second and Third Field Armies retained the same overall position. The proportional changes were a nine percent loss (i.e. thirty fewer seats) for the First FA, a three percent loss for the Second, a one percent gain for the Third, a seven percent gain for the Fourth, a five percent loss (i.e., twenty-seven fewer seats) for the Fifth, and a two percent gain for the Center. In other words, the Fourth FA gained at the expense of the traditionally weaker First and Fifth FAs.

But let us now compare the changes from 1966 to 1971 in the two groups of provinces, Group A, which formed their committees relatively early, and Group B, which took more time to decide on the posts. Chart E shows that the diffusion of FA affiliations, and also of the number of "outsiders," increased in Group B provinces between 1966 and 1971. For example, the FA affiliations of the Fukien secretaries in 1966 were ninety-three percent Third FA and seven percent Second FA. In the 1971 lineup, by contrast, the predominance of the Third FA had fallen, the figures showing fifty-seven percent for the Third FA, twenty-eight percent Fourth FA, and fourteen percent Sixth FA (i.e., figures from the Center in Peking). This pattern was more or less

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\* In 1966 the distribution of "insiders"/"outsiders" was thirty-five (twelve percent) "outsiders," 214 (eighty-five percent) "insiders," and seven (three percent) unknown. In 1971 twenty-seven (seventeen percent) "outsiders," 122 (seventy-eight percent) "insiders" and nine (six percent) unknown. For sources see Chart D and Appendix I.



Chart E

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF MR & FA AFFILIATION OF PROVINCE-LEVEL  
PARTY SECRETARIES IN 1966 & 1971

Committees	MILITARY REGION						FIELD ARMY													
	Outsider		Insider		Unknown	I		II		III		IV		V		VI		Unknown		
	71	66	71	66	71	66	71	66	71	66	71	66	71	66	71	66	71	66	71	66
Group A																				
Anhui	0	17	100	83					40		40	92		22	8				20	
Chekiang	0	22	100	78					60		100	57		12	11				20	
Honan	0	25	100	75						88										
Hunan	0	0	100	100									100	100						
Kansu	33	30	33	70	33		33	60	20		33		7		25		13		33	
Kiangsi	50	0	50	100			50	71			50	100	25							
Kiangsu	0	0	100	100			80	100			80		20							
Kirin	0	10	83	90	17				11		50	43	83	78	11				17	
Kwangsai	25	0	75	100									50	57	11					
Kwangtung	0	0	100	100					40	15			100	89	11					15
Liaoning	0	15	100	70					43	9			60	62	8					
Peking	29	0	71	100											57	91				
Shanghai	0	0	100	100									60	11	33		11		33	
Shensi	20	55	80	45			20	33			100	100	50				9			
Tsinghai	17	18	83	72			17	82				9								
Group B																				
Fukien	29	0	71	100													14			
Heilungkiang	0	0	100	100									28	90						
Hopeh	14	18	86	92					14	9	57	93	40	9	20		82		14	14
Hupei	28	0	72	100					71	71	40		15	14	57					
I. M.	60	0	40	100					20				40		15					
Kweichow	40	25	20	75	40		38		20	87			40		40	62	20		20	
Ninghsia	17	33	50	67	33				34				17	17	33	13	20		34	
Shansi	0	56	100	44			25			22			25	25	50	67	17		11	

Sources: see Chart D and Appendix I.

The underlining indicates base areas of each corresponding field army.

Chart E (Continued)

	MILITARY REGION						FIELD ARMY															
	Outsider			Insider			Unknown		I		II		III		IV		V		VI		Unknown	
	71	66	71	66	71	66	71	66	71	66	71	66	71	66	71	66	71	66	71	66	71	66
Group B	0	18	100	82			71	66	71	66	71	66	71	66	71	66	71	66	71	66	71	66
Shantung	80	10	20	67			40	66	9		9		20	36			80	27		18		22
Sinkiang	37	0	63	100							33	100	20	20			20	11				
Szechwan	0	23	86	77					8		57	79	38	29				8		25		
Tibet	14	13	82	62									14				57	12		8		
Tientsin	25	9	75	91							75	90	25			10			62		14	25
Yunnan																					29	

repeated in Heilunkiang, Inner Mongolia, Kweichow, Ninghsia, Shansi, Sinkiang, Szechwan, Tibet, and Yunnan, all belonging to Group B, which established Party committees late because no faction could claim clear dominance. By contrast, most of the Party committees in Group A retained in 1971 a similar distribution of FA affiliation as before with one particular FA faction clearly predominating. Chekiang, Hunan, Kiangsu, Kirin, Kwantung, Liaoning, and Shanghai were obvious examples.

By the same token, the Party committees in Group B showed a greater proportion of "outsiders" in 1971 than in 1966. "Outsiders" increased their role during this period in eight of the fourteen Party committees, some of them by a very substantial margin. In the case of Fukien, Hupeh, Inner Mongolia, and Szechwan, where no "outsiders" at all had figured in 1966, they claimed by 1971 a total of twenty-nine percent, twenty-eight percent, sixty percent, and thirty-seven percent respectively of the secretarial posts. In Kweichow they increased from twenty-five percent to forty percent, in Sinkiang from ten percent to eighty percent, in Tientsin from thirteen percent to fourteen percent, and in Yunnan from eight percent to twenty-five percent. By contrast, in the provinces in Group A which were early in establishing themselves, only four provinces increased their percentage of "outsiders," namely Kansu, Kiangsi, Kwangsi, and Peking.

It is probably significant that four provinces which are commonly thought of as relatively weak in general economic and political terms, namely Kansu, Kiangsi, Shensi, and Tsinghai, all in Group A, established their Party committees early, in spite of their great diffusion of FA affiliations and substantial numbers of "outsiders" in their committees in 1971. This phenomenon assumes even greater significance when it is observed that the very strong provinces of the Canton and Nanking Military Regions (which are power bases for the Third and Fourth Field Armies respectively), also established their committees early in 1971, and also with an increase of field army affiliations, but without "outsider" infiltration. Only the Third and Fourth Field Armies increased their secretarial representation in these provinces in 1971. Let us take a closer look at the provinces concerned here, namely Anhwei, Chekiang, and Kiangsu (in the Nanking Military Region, stronghold of the Third



Field Army), and Kwantung, Kwangsi, and Hunan (in the Canton Military Region, stronghold of the Fourth Field Army). Each of these six provinces established its committee early without changing leaders and without appointing a second secretary. Furthermore, all except one (Kwangsi) excluded "outsiders" (see Chart C). But in terms of field army affiliation the case is less decisive. With the exception of Kwangtung and Hunan, which had exclusively Fourth Field Army men, the remaining four committees absorbed elites from other field armies.

The conclusion from these correlations appears to be that provincial politics tend to be less tense both in the strongholds of clearly powerful FA or MR bases (such as Nanking and Canton MRs) and in clearly weak FA or MR territories (such as Kiangsi, Shensi, and Tsinghai), presumably because they are either strong enough totally to resist "outsiders" whether in MR or FA affiliation terms, or contrariwise, are too weak to put up any resistance to them at all. Only where a province is in an intermediate position, or where the pattern of power is changing, with formerly strong units becoming weaker or vice versa, can great turmoil be expected.

What about the military/civilian dichotomy? Men with military status indisputably enhanced their position in 1971 as compared with 1966, occupying sixty-one percent of the secretarial posts in 1971, against only ten percent in 1966. After provincial power had changed hands during the formation of the provincial and municipal Party committees, all of the first secretaries of the twenty-nine committees currently chaired the corresponding revolutionary committees. When one correlates this with the fact that military men occupy twenty-six (or ninety percent) of the twenty-nine first secretary positions, the judgment is reinforced that military control of provincial government and Party power was unprecedentedly absolute by early 1971. But military control of political power was more impressive in the provinces than at the Center. The percentage of both regular and alternate professional soldiers who were members of the CCP Central Committee in 1971 was 45.59 percent.\* Skillful civilian power brokers, notably Mao Tse-tung and

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\*Ting Wang, *A Preliminary Appraisal of the Personnel of the New CCP Central Committee*, Contemporary China Research Institute, Hong Kong, 1971, p. 7.



Chou En-lai, might have resisted the expansion of military power in the Center. According to a study by Ting Wang, Mao Tse-tung apparently tried to reduce the power of Lin Piao's Fourth Field Army in order to maintain his own dominant position within the CCP.\* But in the provinces, lacking shrewd civilian politicians, military control was strengthened in the face of less resourceful resistance from the helpless civilians.

The data on generation affiliations is so thin that comparisons between 1971 and 1966 are rendered highly dubious.\*\* However, the overwhelming strength of third generation personalities in 1971 (forty-two percent) warrants the conclusion that this generation has already established itself in power at the provincial level. It would seem natural, therefore, for this third generation to attempt to extend its power in the regions as well as the Center in the near future. It is also worthy of note that by 1971 the seventh and eighth generations had surpassed the fifth and sixth in assuming leading posts in the provinces. The fifth and sixth generations occupied less than three percent of the provincial secretaryships, while the seventh and eighth occupied seven percent. The new emphasis on youthful leadership in China today, characterized by the prominence at the Center in 1972 of Yao Wen-yüan (of the seventh generation and in his forties), suggests that the seventh and eighth generations, who are in their thirties and forties today, may soon have their turn of power in the localities immediately behind the third and fourth generations.

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\* Ibid., p. 10.

\*\* The generation affiliation of almost three-quarters of the provincial secretaries is unknown for 1966. The generation distribution of the 158 provincial secretaries in 1971 is: thirteen (eight percent) for G I (generation I), twenty-five (sixteen percent) for G II, sixty-six (forty-two percent) for G III, fourteen (nine percent) for G IV, one (0.6 percent) for G V, three (two percent) for G VI, eleven (seven percent) for G VII and G VIII, and twenty-five (sixteen percent) unknown. The distribution of 283 secretaries in 1966 is: thirty-nine (fourteen percent) for G I, seventeen (six percent) for G II, twelve (four percent) for G III, five (two percent) for G IV, one (0.3 percent) for each G V and G VI, and 207 (seventy-four percent) unknown.

### Conclusions

In this paper, it has been shown that there is a clear correlation between the later establishment of provincial and municipal Party committees, on the one hand, and personal changes in the leadership, second secretary appointments, professional career differences, field army affiliation differences, and military region affiliation differences, on the other hand. It could hardly be argued that all these correlations are merely coincidental. It is more likely that they may be considered as indices of political stability or instability in the Chinese provinces. The comparison between the Party secretaries of 1966 and those of 1971 shows that the First and Fifth Field Armies lost "seats" while the Second, Third, and Fourth Field Armies maintained their relative positions in 1971. Thus, following the storms of the Cultural Revolution, it is the Second, Third, and Fourth FAs which have emerged as the principal competitors for political power. If the fall of Lin Biao, founder of the Fourth Field Army, leads to the decline of the Fourth FA group, then the Second and Third FA groups, most of whose officers originated in Chang Kuo-t'ao's Fourth Front Army and served together through the Civil War, will probably survive as the two major military and political rivals -- or alternatively as allies in the construction of a possible base of stability in Chinese politics during the rest of the 1970s. The roles of the Fourth and Fifth FAs and of remnants not affiliated to any FA are likely to be reduced to participation in coalition partnership, both at the Center and in the regions. But whereas FA bonds continue to constitute a major factor in the intricate play of factional politics at the Center, it seems that they are gradually eroding in the provinces.

The third generation group increased its role in the provincial secretaryships from four percent in 1966 to forty-one percent in 1971 (although this is based on very thin data) and that the seventh and eighth generation group overtook the fifth and sixth.\* If the promotion pattern in China -- from provincial level (such as military districts) to regional level (military regions) to the Center -- is maintained, it can be anticipated that the third generation will rise to prominence at the regional and even national levels in the near future, while the

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\* See second footnote, page 22.

seventh and eighth generation groups assume key positions at the provincial level. If this trend towards seventh and eighth domination in the provinces continues, it is possible that by 1980 field army affiliation will no longer be a meaningful factor in provincial politics. It may be recalled that the seventh and eighth generations entered the Party or the army during the 1950s and that in 1954 the military regions replaced the field army system. These generations, therefore, have little sense of field army affiliation or of its value. It is the sense of location supported by military region affiliations, which is likely to become more important as an indicator of corporate and personal loyalties.

A deepening of regionalism in the provinces is shown by the apparent dominance of "insiders" among the provincial secretaries. In early 1971, only twenty-eight of the 158 provincial secretarial positions were occupied by "outsiders." Moreover, this process by which "outsiders" are replaced by "insiders," has proceeded in the period following mid-1971. Among the thirty-five new Party secretaries, twenty (or fifty-seven percent) were "insiders," and five (or fourteen percent) were "outsiders" (see Appendix II). This shows a gathering tendency towards regionalism based on military regions in the appointment and dismissal of provincial leaders in China.

Therefore, this paper concludes that military region affiliations have become a significant corporate loyalty in contemporary China's politics, particularly at the provincial and military regional level. A study based on more data on position distribution between "insiders" and "outsiders" from 1956 to 1971 shows that the overwhelming majority of "insiders" were responsible for the significant political personnel shifts (elite losses and gains).<sup>\*</sup> The data reveal that more than eighty percent of civil and military losses and gains during the fifteen-year period were accounted for by "insiders" in all military regions. This data concurrently demonstrates stability of leadership within key military regions, their resistance to "outsider" invasion, and military region command of the loyalty of civilian cadres as well as military

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<sup>\*</sup>Whitson, *Chinese Military and Political Leaders and the Distribution of Power in China, 1956-1971*, p. 114, and Appendices G and I.



cadres, at least since 1956. Furthermore, it suggests the emergence of a new loyalty system based on powerful regional leaders who can offer more than Peking in reliable career rewards (and punishments) to subordinates.

Commanders of these military regions stood firmly in their posts for many years and consequently reinforced their building of "mountain strongholds." Yang Te-chih was the commander of the Tsinan MR from 1958 to December 1973; Hsu Shih-yu was the only commander of the Nanking MR from 1954 to 1973; Han Hsien-chu succeeded Yeh Fei in 1960 and was the commander of the Fuchow MR until 1973; Ch'en Hsi-lien retained the commandership of the Shenyang MR from 1960 to 1973; Tseng Szu-yu, who replaced Chen Tsai-tao as the commander of the Wuhan MR, was closely associated with Yang Te-chih of Tsinan MR and Chen Hsi-lien of Shenyang; and P'i Ting-chun, who became the commander of the Lanchow MR, was a subordinate of Hsu Shih-yu and Ch'en Hsi-lien for many years.\* In addition to such longevity of these senior commanders in their posts and their close associations with the junior commanders, all the senior commanders were concurrently heads of provincial Party and revolutionary committees in their regions since 1971.

Implications of this development are significant. When military regions became the focal units for promotion and, consequently, focal units of interest-group loyalty, the regional bosses could provide reliable patronage for the career success of their subordinates. Therefore, their regional power was strengthened and their bargaining power with the Center was increased. The continuation of this trend in China could mean that the power holders in key military regions would appear as kings or at least kingmakers. Thus, power holders at the Center must grasp any opportunity to resist this development.

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\* See Huang Chen-hsia's *Mao's Generals* for biographical data on these commanders.

The extensive reshuffling of military commands revealed in Peking on New Year's Day<sup>\*</sup> can be interpreted as Premier Chou En-lai's, and possibly Mao's, recognition of military regions. The shifts, however, are more likely a result of consultations and compromises between Peking and the key commanders, rather than a swift dictate from Peking.<sup>\*\*</sup> Although evidence of compromises has yet to be found, it is also likely that as long as the consultations and compromises could satisfy Chen Hsi-lien and Hsu Shih-yu, the two most powerful and senior commanders, the rest of the commanders would comply. If the dramatic military shifts in China are successful in lessening military regional power, they will strengthen the Central control and promote professionalism. A bureaucratic functional system of rival loyalties may replace the system based on military regions.

This reshuffle of military commands also provides an opportunity to reinforce the civilian control of political organizations in the provinces. All but P'i Ting-chun, who was Second Secretary and Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee in Kansu Province, were the top Party and Revolutionary Committee officials in their former regions. Who comes in to fill these posts will be significant. However, civilian replacements for military leaders in the provinces have been the trend since the fall of Lin Piao. When the twenty-nine provincial-level Party committees were established in August 1971, there were ninety-seven military figures and fifty-seven civilians in secretarial posts (with four of unknown status). By June 1973, thirteen out of these ninety-seven military figures (or thirteen percent) had disappeared, whereas

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<sup>\*</sup> Changes were made in the commands of eight of eleven military regions. Hsu Shih-yu was transferred from Nanking to command the Canton MR. Chen Hsi-lien was put in charge of the Peking MR. Li Teh-sheng was appointed commander of the Shenyang MR. Ting Sheng was transferred from Canton into the Nanking post vacated by Hsu. Tseng Szu-yu, commander of the Wuhan MR, exchanged places with Yang Te-chih, who headed the Tsinan MR. Han Hsien-chu, commander of the Fuchow MR, exchanged positions with P'i Ting-chun, head of the Lanchow MR. Source: NCNA, Peking, 1 January 1974.

<sup>\*\*</sup> Chou En-lai's frequent visits to Shenyang and Nanking in 1973 and secret consultations in Peking in late December could be related to these military shifts.

all of the fifty-seven civilians had retained their posts (see first footnote, page 15). Proportionally, more military men than civilians disappeared from provincial-level Party organizations. Furthermore, among the thirty-five new secretaries appointed since the summer of 1971, only eleven (thirty-two percent) were military and sixteen (forty-six percent) were civilians (see Appendix II).

It is true that more veteran Party officials have been rehabilitated in the provinces in the period since mid-1971. But none of them have gained the number one position of first secretary in the provincial Party committees: the highest positions to which they have been appointed are second level ones such as vice-chairmen of revolutionary committees and secretaries or deputy secretaries of the provincial Party committees. Despite the clear statistical trend towards civilian replacement of military men in the provinces, the military have continued to control the higher seats of power, at least up to late 1973.



## Appendix I

## BACKGROUNDS OF 1966 CCP PROVINCIAL PARTY SECRETARIES

Committee	#	MR			FA							Mil.	Civ
		"Out"	"In"	Unk	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	Unk		
Anhui	12	2	10				11		1			0	12
Chekiang	9	2	7				6	2	1			1	8
Fukien	13	0	13			1	12					1	12
Heilungkiang	10	0	10			1		9				1	9
Honan	8	2	6			7		1				1	7
Hopeh	11	2	9			1		1	9			1	10
Hunan	11	0	11					11				1	10
Hupei	7	0	7			5		1			1	1	6
I. M.	8	0	8		3				5			1	
Kansu	15	5	10		9	3		1		2		2	1
Kiangsi	7	0	7		2		5					1	
Kiangsu	10	0	10				10					2	
Kirin	9	1	8			1		7	1			0	
Kwangsi	7	0	7				3	4				2	
Kwangtung	9	0	9					8	1			1	
Kweichow	8	2	6			7			1			0	
Liaoning	13	2	9	2		2		8	1		2	0	1
Ninghsia	6	2	4		3			1	2			0	
Peking	11	0	11			1			10			0	1
Shanghai	9	0	9				9					1	
Shansi	9	0	8	1		2			6		1	0	
Shantung	11	2	9		1	1	4		3	2		1	1
Shensi	9	5	4		3		1	1	3	1		0	
Sinkiang	9	1	6	2	6				1		2	3	
Szechwan	9	0	9			9						1	
Tibet	13	3	10		1	10			1	1		3	1
Tientsin	8	1	5	2					1	5	2	0	
Tsinghai	11	2	9		9		1			1		0	1
Yunnan	11	1	10			10		1				2	
Total	283	35	241	7	37	61	62	56	47	12	8	27	25
%		12%	85%	3%	13%	22%	22%	20%	17%	4%	3%	10%	9

Sources: *Who's Who in Communist China*, Vols. I and II, Union Research Institute, Hong Kong, 1969-1970; and Huang Chen-hsia, *Mao's Generals*, Research Institute of Contemporary History, Hong Kong, 1968.



Appendix IINEW SECRETARIES OF THE PROVINCE-LEVEL PARTY COMMITTEES  
(as of July 5, 1973)

Committee	Name	FA	Outsider/		Cdr/ Cmsr	Mil/ Civ		Date Identif.
			Insider			Gen		
Chekiang	T'an Ch'i-lung	3	Out		Cmsr	M	1	2/73
	Tieh Ying					C		6/72
	Chen Wei-ta	3	In			C		12/72
Fukien	Kuo Shao-ching							7/12
Heilungkiang	Chang I-hou							2/72
	Li Li-an	6	In			C		5/73
Honan	Tai Su-li	2	In			C		5/73
Hunan	Chang Ping-hua	4	In			C		4/73
Hupeh	Wang Liu-sheng	3	Out		Cmsr	M	3	7/72
	Chao Hsiu	2	In			C		1/13
	Wang Ko-wen		In			C		1/73
	Han Ning-fu	2	In			C		1/73
Kansu	Sung Ping		Out			C		12/72
	Chang Chung	2	In		Cdr	M	3	7/72
Kiangsi	She Chi-te		In		Cmsr	M		1/73
	Huang Chih-chen	3	In			C	2	7/72
	Chen Chang-feng	3	In		Cdr	M	3	1/73
Kirin	Sun Chi-hua							8/71
Kwangtung	Chao Tzu-yang	4	In			C	(7)	1/73
	Liu Li-ming					C		1/73
Kweichow	Lu Jui-lin	2	In		Cdr	M	2	4/73
	Kuo Chao	2	In			C		4/73
Liaoning	Chen A-fen							12/72
	Kao Wen-chung							3/73
	Huang Ou-tung	2	In			C	1	3/73
Sinkiang	Yang Yung	2	Out		Cdr	M	2	7/73
	Ho Lin-chao							7/73
	Szu Mayi-i-ai- mai-ti	1	In			C		9/72
	Chang Shih-kung		In			C		1/73
Szechwan	Ho Cheng-wen	2	In		Cdr	M	1	4/73
	Yü Shu-sheng	2	In		Cmsr	M	3	4/73
	Liu Hsing-yuan	4	Out		Cmsr	M	3	2/73
Tsinghai	Wen Tzu-ts'ai		In			M		10/72
	Yang Yen							12/72
	Hsu Chih-han							10/72

Source: FBIS, September 1, 1971 to July 5, 1973.